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Introduction
Incorporation of prior information is important in any decision or inference setting, whether it is done formally or informally. The formal Bayesian approach encourages transparency in assumptions, clear thinking and coherence. One example is * Cornell University, Departments of Economics and Statistical Science, 490 Uris Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853-7601, US, email:nicholas.kiefer@cornell.edu; US Department of the Treasury, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Risk Analysis Division, and CREATES, funded by the Danish Science Foundation, University of Aarhus,Denmark. Disclaimer: The statements made and views expressed herein are solely those of the author, and do not necessarily represent official policies, statements or views of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency or its staff. risk management in financial institutions in which prudent management requires understanding default probabilities for groups of homogeneous assets. In the case of very safe or new types of assets, there may not be enough data information to support a practical conventional estimator, for example the frequency estimator in the case of binomial defaults. This issue has attracted regulatory and industry as well as academic attention, see Kiefer (2009) , and references given there. Kiefer (2010) proposes eliciting prior quantiles for an expert's prior on the value of the default probability for a particular group of assets. For example, the median can be assessed by asking the expert at what value of a default rate θ would he be equally suprised to see a realization above or below θ. These quantiles (perhaps after feedback and revision) are assembled into a distribution, either by fitting a specific functional form or as proposed by Kiefer (2010) fit to a smoothed maximumentropy distribution. The idea is to impose as little information as possible beyond that elicited from the expert. This distribution is then used to process data infor- The difficult part is the elicitation of the quantiles, which requires thought and therefore some effort from the expert. Since the quantiles can never be observed, and therefore the assessment checked, there is an issue of providing an incentive for 2 the expert to provide the required thought. The problem of eliciting probabilities for given sets is well-studied and a widely-used approach is scoring. The scoring method does not naturally extend to the quantile assessment problem, as shown in Section 2. Savage (1971) reviews techniques for assessing probabilities and notes an interesting interpretation of probabilities as prices. He notes that the device of outside randomization, used by Marschak (1964) to compel a true valuation for a bid or asked price applies also to probability assessment. An ingenious recent method due to Karni (2009) introduces a second outside source of randomness to eliminate possible effects of risk aversion. This method does extend naturally to eliciting quantiles as shown in Section 2 with a different development than that of Marschak or Karni. Section 3 concludes.
Eliciting Quantiles
Assume at the outset that the expert's information about the unknown quantity θ is coherent, that is that it can be described by a probability distribution. Classical discussions of the necessity of describing uncertainty in terms of probability are Savage (1954 ), De Finetti (1974 , and Lindley (1982) . We do not review these wellknown demonstrations and simply assume that the expert's information is described in a probability distribution with cdf F (θ) and pdf f (θ). We wish to elicit the probability α quantile q α with F (q α ) = α. Assume that f (q α ) > 0 so that the quantile is well-defined. Assume for convenience that Supp(f ) ⊆ [0, 1]. This is natural when the uncertain quantity θ is a default probability; in other cases a parameter transformation may be appropriate. The method of scoring for eliciting 3 the probability β associated with a given set, say [0, q], rewards the expert with
where I() is the indicator function g 1 (β) is a nondecreasing function, g 0 (β) is a nonincreasing function and β is the elicited probability, after the single realization of θ is seen. The scoring rule is proper if the expectation Er(β|q) = F (q)g 1 (β) +
(1 − F (q))g 0 (β) is maximized at β = q α . See Schervish (1989) . The optimal choice of β for a risk-neutral expert rewarded by a proper scoring rule is F (q). Fixing β and using this method to elicit the quantile q does not work as the optimal choice of q is 0 for g 0 (β) ≥ g 1 (β) and 1 for g 0 (β) ≤ g 1 (β).
The new method based on outside randomness works as follows. Suppose the elicitor wishes q a . The elicitor has access to a genie which generates a random vari- Theorem 1 With the reward described above the optimal policy for the expert is to report the true quantile. 
The first-order condition is v (q) = u(r)(−F (q) + F (q α )) = 0 and the function is concave, so the optimal policy for the expert is to report the true quantile.
The binomial random variable is not needed if the expert is risk neutral. In that case the rd payoff can be replaced by rα.
An alternative proof from a decision-theoretic point of view and using lotteries can be given. This proof uses preferences over lotteries but does not require the full expected utility framework. Let (x, p) ∈ R × [0, 1] denote the lottery that pays $x with probability p and $0 with probability (1 − p). The expert payoff is (r, F (ξ)) if ξ > q and (r, α) if ξ ≤ q. Consider the report q > q α . If ξ > q then the expert's payoff is (r, F (ξ)) whether he reports q or q α . If ξ ≤ q α then the expert's payoff is (r, α) whether he reports q or q α . If q α < ξ < q then the expert's payoff is (r, α).
However, had he reported q α instead, his reward would have been (r, F (ξ)) . But F (ξ) > α hence (r, F (ξ)) first-order stochastically dominates (r, α) so the expert cannot win and may lose as a result of reporting q > q α .Similarly, reporting q < q α is dominated.
Conclusion
The classical elicitation problem concerns eliciting probabilities for given events.
This paper studies the complementary problem of eliciting events for given probabilities. This is the problem involved in obtaining prior quantiles. Although the reward r does not affect the optimality condition, it is clear that the actual effort expended by the expert will depend on the value of the reward (precisely, on its utility). Perhaps some part of a bonus could be tied into the probability assessment.
Interesting open questions include: Which quantiles and how many should be assessed? How much accuracy can be expected in a quantile assessment? Can experts be trained to improve their assessments? How can prior quantiles be assessed from a group of experts?
